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Empirical regularities from high-inﬂation economies, especially inLatinAmer-
ica, suggest that exchange rate-based (ERB) disinﬂations and money-based (MB)
disinﬂations induce sharply different dynamics in consumption and GDP. I study
the role of nominal rigidities to explain business cycle ﬂuctuations associated to
ERB and MB disinﬂations within a single framework. By building on Calvo’s
(1983) pricing theory, this paper introduces elements of state-dependent pricing at
the ﬁrm level into an otherwise standard small open economy model. This new fea-
ture allows for endogenous variations in the aggregate degree of nominal rigidities.
The model contains as a special case a time-dependent pricing model discussed in
the literature. Nonlinear simulations show that the model with state-dependent
nominal rigidities generates a dynamic behavior that is more consistent with the
empirical evidence, compared to the model with time-dependent pricing.
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Empirical regularities from high-inﬂation economies, especially in Latin America, sug-
gest that exchange rate-based (ERB) disinﬂation programs and money-based (MB) dis-
inﬂation programs induce different dynamics. Such differences are sharper in GDP and
consumption. ERB disinﬂations are characterized by an initial sustained boom in real
activity followed by a later recession, whereas MB programs are accompanied by an
initial short-lived recession followed by a recovery (Calvo and Végh [1999]).
In models with nominal rigidities, the gradual response of nominal prices to mon-
etary policies creates trade-offs between inﬂation and output that are summarized by
the Phillips curve. Thus, models with nominal rigidities predict inﬂation-output trade-
offs consistent with the initial dynamics of MB disinﬂation programs. However, by the
same token, they are less successful in explaining the initial expansionary phase of ERB
disinﬂations.
In the literature of ERB disinﬂations it is often the case that inﬂation acts as a distor-
tionary tax on the relative price of consumption and leisure, then a disinﬂation program
that eliminates such distortioncan generate an initial expansionary impulsein consump-
tion. However, in economies with nominal rigidities as those in Calvo, Celasun and
Kumhof (2003), Rebelo and Végh (1995) or Uribe (1999), such initial expansionary
impulse is ameliorated or eliminated by the effects of the Phillips curve (Rebelo and
Végh [1995]). Moreover, in models with ﬂexible prices the inﬂation-output trade-offs
consistent with the initial dynamics of MB disinﬂations are not present.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the role of nominal rigidities to
explain the dynamics induced by credible and noncredible ERB and MB disinﬂation
programs within a single framework. The model extends Calvo (1983) time-dependent
pricing to introduce elements of state-dependent pricing at the ﬁrm level into an other-wise standard small open economy model.
Elements of state-dependent pricing allow for endogenous variations in the degree
of nominal rigidities. That is, when faced with large monetary shocks, ﬁrms may ﬁnd
optimal to revise their pricing policies more often to accommodate the new state of
the economy. In contrast, in models with time-dependent pricing—as those mentioned
above—the average frequency at which nominal prices incorporate changes in the state
of the economy is constant and exogenous.
As in Calvo (1983) pricing, the model assumes that ﬁrms change their pricing poli-
cies infrequently, only if they receive a random signal with constant probability. How-
ever, different from time-dependent models, ﬁrms can choose a higher probability of
pricing-plan revisions as part of their optimal pricing plan. Price-setters must pay a
cost to beneﬁt from faster pricing-plan revisions. Following Dotsey, King and Wolman
(1999), thiscostisrandom. Aﬁrm choosesahigherprobabilityofpricing-planrevisions
if the cost of doing so is compensated by the change in the value of the ﬁrm.
The combination of state-dependent and time-dependent features in the ﬁrm’s pric-
ing is consistent with economies in which the main cost of changing pricing policies is
the cost of learning the state of the economy. As argued by Woodford (2004, Ch. 3)
or Blanchard and Fisher (2000, Ch. 8), when the cost of learning the state of the econ-
omy is the main cost in pricing, ﬁrms must set the date of pricing revisions in calendar
time. The model shares such characteristic with time-dependent models. However, the
new feature in ﬁrm’s pricing shows that when ﬁrms face large monetary shocks, they
may have a strong incentive to adjust pricing policies more often. That endogenizes the
aggregate degree of nominal rigidities.
The pricing scheme of the model contains as a special case the time-dependent pric-
ing discussed in Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2003) for an open economy or in Ces-
2pedes, Kumhof and Parrado (2003) for a closed economy. In policy experiments, I use
such special case of the model to isolate the effects of state-dependent pricing.
I study the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables under three disinﬂation sce-
narios. The ﬁrst natural experiment is a permanent and credible disinﬂation program,
howeveras pointedout by Calvo and Végh (1999), a commoncharacteristic of stabiliza-
tionprogramsisimperfectcredibility. Inthesecondexperiment,asinCalvo(1986), lack
of credibility takes the form of a temporary program that lasts for τ quarters, thereafter
the program is abandoned. The third experiment introduces uncertainty. As in Mendoza
and Uribe (1997) or Uribe (2002), in the third experiment agents attach probabilities to
the abandonment of the disinﬂation program.
Nonlinear simulations show that in a temporary ERB disinﬂation program lasting
twelve quarters, the model with state-dependent nominal rigidities predicts that, as long
as the program is in place, the economy faces a gradually lower degree of nominal
rigidities. That in turn, gives room for a sustained expansion in the consumption of
tradables—i.e., the sector with nominal rigidities,—followed by a later recession. The
boom reaches its peak eight quarters after the implementation of the program. In con-
trast, in the model’s special case of constant nominal rigidities, counterfactually, the
recession sets forth immediately after the beginning of the program.
The initial equilibrium path of other key macroeconomic variables is in accordance
with observed ERB disinﬂation episodes. Namely, a gradual fall in inﬂation, an initial
appreciation of the real exchange rate and a boom-recession cycle in the tradable sector.
At the microeconomic level, when the ERB program is perceived as imperfectly
credible, ﬁrms are willing to spend between ﬁve and six percent of their proﬁts to im-
plement more frequent pricing-plan revisions. Such incentive lasts for almost the entire
duration of the program. That ﬁgures agree with ﬁrm level evidence on the cost of
3pricing activities presented in Zbaraki et al. (2003).
The qualitative properties of the model with state-dependent nominal rigidities and
its special case of constant nominal rigidities found for temporary ERB programs also
hold in ERB programs of uncertain duration. Moreover, they are robust to alternative
calibrations.
On the other hand, in temporary MB disinﬂations or MB programs with uncertain
duration, the model with state-dependent nominal rigidities and its special case, they
both predict an initial short-lived recession in nontradables. Moreover, the transition
dynamics of both models are qualitative similar.
Therest ofthepaperisorganizedas follows. Section2presentsthemodelforasmall
open economy, in particular, subsection 2.2 presents the pricing problem of the ﬁrms
in the nontradable sector. Section 3 discusses the dynamics of the three stabilization
programs studied, including a subsection with sensitivity analysis. Section 4 presents
some concluding remarks.
2 The Small Open Economy
The small, open economy is populated by a representative household, a continuum of
monopolistic competitive ﬁrms indexed by z ∈ [0,1], a ﬁscal authority and a monetary
authority. For ease of the exposition assume that all agents in the economy have perfect-
foresight. I will introduce uncertainty in the subsection 3.4.
Assume that the law of one price holds for internationally tradable goods. This is,
P T
t = EtP T∗
t in any period t = 0,1,2..., where P T
t and P T∗
t denote the nominal price
of tradables in the domestic and foreign economy respectively, and Et is the nominal
exchange rate. Moreover, normalizing the foreign price of tradables to one, the law of
one price implies P T
t = Et.
4The nominal price index of nontradables is P N




t−1 is the gross
inﬂation rate of nontradable goods. I deﬁne the real exchange rate, et, as the relative
price of tradable goods in terms of nontradables, that is, et = Et/P N
t . The economy
can freely borrow from or lend to the rest of the world, then an uncovered interest parity
holds. This is, the domestic nominal interest rate, it, satisﬁes
1 + it = (1 + r)εt+1 , (1)
where r > 0 is the real international interest rate and εt ≡ Et/Et−1 is the gross depreci-
ation rate of the nominal exchange rate.
2.1 The Household
The representative household derives utility from leisure and from consumption of a
basket of goods containing a homogeneous tradable good CT
t and a variety of hetero-
geneous nontradable goods cN
t (z), where z corresponds to the index of the producing











 1−ζ , (2)
where Γ > 0,ζ > 0,ϕ ∈ [0,1) and κ > 0 are parameters shaping the household’s
preferences. nt is time allocated to work, with the total endowment of time per period
normalizedtoone, andCt isacompositebasket oftradableand nontradablegoods. Note
that, as in Uribe (2002), preferences allow for non-separability over time in consump-
tion,1 however ϕ = 0 corresponds to the more conventional case of time separability in
consumption.
1Uribe (2002) shows that for a small open economy with ﬂexible prices, non-separabilityover time in
consumption can help to rationalize stylized facts associated to exchange-rate-baseddisinﬂations.












where γ ∈ (0,1) and CN
t ≡







with θ > 1, is the Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator of consumption over varieties of nontradable goods cN
t (z).
Householdsholdinternationallytradedbondsdenominatedinunitsoftradablegoods,
bt, which yield a real interest rate r. The sources of funds in period t include: the prin-
cipal and the return of bonds purchased at t − 1, bt−1(1 + r), an endowment of tradable
goods Y T
t = Y T, identical lump-sum transfers in terms of tradables, at, remunerations
from labor at a nominal wage rate Wt, and lump-sum transfers equal to the aggregate

























The uses of funds consist of consumption of the homogeneous tradable good CT
t ,
consumption of nontradable goods cN
t (z) with nominal price pN
t (z) for z ∈ [0,1], trans-
action costs proportional to consumption expenditure s(·), real bonds in terms of trad-
ables purchased at t, bt, and money balances Mt carried to t + 1.
Following Kimbrough (1986), purchases of goods are subject to transaction costs















where mt ≡ Mt/Et.
Imposing the no Ponzi game condition, limt→∞
mt+bt
(1+r)t ≥ 0, and using the uncovered
interest parity (1) we can rewrite the budget constraint as
m−1
ε0





























The representative household chooses Ct, CT
t , CN
t , cN
t (z) ∀z, nt, mt and ut for









subject to the consumption aggregator (3), the transaction costs technology (4), the
money velocity (5) and the budget constraint (6).














t is the utility-based price index deﬁned by P N
t ≡









Let χ denote the time-invariant Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget con-



























where su(·) is the derivative of s(·) with respect to ut.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to real money balances yields (ut)2su(ut) =
it/(1 + it), which, from the transaction costs technology (4) and the money velocity






















where wt ≡ Wt/P N
t is the real wage rate in terms of nontradables. Finally, the ﬁrst-




Extending Calvo’s (1983) pricing, I assume that ﬁrms in the economy can change their
pricingplanswithoutcostwithprobability(1−αL). However,ﬁrmscan payalump-sum
8cost to increase theirprobabilityofpricing-plan revisionsto (1−αH), where (1−αH) >
(1 − αL).
As in Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), ﬁrms face a random lump-sum cost that
avoids faster pricing-plan revisions. Once a ﬁrm receives the random signal to change
its pricing plan it also observes the realization of the random cost ξ ≥ 0 that the ﬁrm
has to pay to increase its probability of pricing-plan revisions. The random cost ξ is
measured in units of nontradable output.
If the ﬁrm does not pay the random lump-sum cost ξ, it is subject to the lower
probabilityof pricing-plan revisions, but it can set a new pricing-plan withoutadditional
cost. Different from Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), ﬁrms evaluate their pricing
policies infrequently. That is, with probability (1 − αj) for j = H,L, as opposed to
with probability one in each period 2. As pointed out in the introduction, infrequent
evaluations of pricing policies is consistent with economies where the main restriction
inhibiting ﬂexible prices is the cost of internalizing the state of the economy in pricing
decisions.
A ﬁrm paying the random cost ξ at t′ will be subject to a probability of pricing-
plan revisions (1 − αH) until it receives a new random signal, say at t′ + s. Then the
monopolistic ﬁrm will choose at t′ + s either to pay the random cost again and keep the
higher probability of pricing-plan revisions, or not to pay the random cost and set its
probability equal to (1 − αL)—see Figure 1.
Extending Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2003) I assume that a pricing plan consists
of an initial price pN∗
j,t′(z), a ﬁrm speciﬁc growth rate for the ﬁrm’s initial price, ̟j,t′(z),
and a probability of pricing-plan revisions (1 − αj), where j = H,L.
2In Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999) ﬁrms evaluate in each period their pricing policies. That is,
price-settersmustsolveadynamicoptimizationproblemineachperiod,whichrequiresinformationabout
the state of theeconomy. Intheir model,ﬁrms set newprices if by doingso, thevalue ofthe ﬁrm increases
enough to cover a random lump-sum cost associated to the physical cost of changing prices.






Pr[It(z∗)] = 1 − λt
z∗
Figure 1: Pricing Mechanism
A ﬁrm can revise pricing-plans without cost with probability (1−αL). The ﬁrm z′ setting a new
pricing policy at t, increases its probability of pricing-plan revisions to (1 − αH) by paying the
random lump-sum cost ξ with probability λt. The set Vt accounts for the mass of ﬁrm acting
under the probability of pricing-plan revisions (1−αH). The ﬁrm z∗ setting a new pricing policy
at t decides not to pay the random cost with probability (1−λt) by setting pricing-policies under
(1 − αL). The set  t accounts for the ﬁrms acting under (1 − αL).






. Given the initial price and its growth rate, the






j,t′(z), for s = 0,1,2.... (13)
The time-dependent pricing rule (13) is in place until the next pricing-plan revision.
The value of a ﬁrm z in period t′ can be described using four recursions, two of them
associated to its value at t′, D0,j,t′, given that z is choosing (1 − αj), for j = H,L. The
other two recursions are associated to the value of z at t′+s, D1,j,t′+s, for s = 1,2,3...
and j = H,L, given that z has not changed its pricing plan since t′. The four recursions
account for the possibility of acting under two different probabilities of pricing-plan
revisions and the two possibilities of being allowed to change pricing-plans or not. In
what follows I describe the value of the ﬁrm and its optimal pricing-plan.
10The value of the ﬁrm
Consider the maximization problem for a ﬁrm receiving the random signal to revise
pricing plans at t′. The ﬁrm decides a new pricing-plan and its probability of pricing-
plan revisions. The decision is based on the value of the ﬁrm under each probability of
pricing-plan adjustment.
Let It+1(z) be the indicator function equal to one if z chooses (1 − αH) at t + 1
and zero otherwise. Let λt+1 ≡ Pr[It+1(z) = 1] be the probability of z choosing






t be the real proﬁts—in terms of
nontradables—at t for the ﬁrm z, given its price pN
j,t(z).
Firms choosing a pricing policy in t′ discount real proﬁts received in t′ + 1 using
the domestic real interest rate in terms of nontradables. The one-period ahead discount






The real value at t′, in terms of nontradables, of a ﬁrm subject to the probability
(1−αj), for j = H,L, which receives the random signal of pricing-plan revisions at t′,
gross of the random cost, is given by the recursion



















+ (1 − αj)ωt′+1λt′+1
 
D0,H,t′+1 (St′+1) − Ξt′+1
 





where St′ is a vector of variables describing the state of the economy at t′ and Ξt′+1,
deﬁned below, is the expected random cost conditional on choosing (1 − αH) at t′ + 1
with probability λt′+1
3.
3Note thatat the ﬁrmlevelﬁrms faceidiosyncraticrandomnessinthe randomlump-sumcost, however
11The recursion (14) has a straightforward interpretation. For example, set j = H.
Then, it follows from (14) that the value of the ﬁrm z at t′ acting under (1 − αH),





plus the discounted expected value of the
ﬁrm at t′+1. The last three lines in (14) describe the expected value of the ﬁrm at t′+1
under the three possible circumstances.
First, with probability αH the ﬁrm is not allowed to change its pricing plan. Thus,
it is not allowed to choose a different probability of pricing-plan adjustments. In that
case, the value of the ﬁrm at t′ + 1 is D1,H,t′+1(·)—described below.
Second, with probability (1 − αH) the ﬁrm receives the random signal of pricing-
plan revisions—which is strictly time dependent—thus, with probability (1−αH)λt′+1,
the ﬁrm decides to pay the random cost with conditional expected value Ξt′+1. In that
case, the value of the ﬁrm is [D0,H,t′+1 − Ξt′+1].
Finally with probability (1−αH) the ﬁrm is allowed to revise its pricing policy, and
with probability (1 − λt′+1) the ﬁrm decides not to pay the random cost. Therefore, it
will be subject to the probability of pricing-plan changes (1 − αL). In that case, the
value of the ﬁrm is D0,L,t′+1(·).
Following the same principle, the value of the ﬁrm at t′+s, for s = 1,2,3,..., acting
under (1 − αj), if it has not received the signal of pricing-plan revisions since t′, is
























Note that the maximization operator does not appear in (15) because the only deci-
it will become clear later that ﬁrms can have perfect foresight on the aggregate variables of the economy.
12sion made is input demand, which is implicit in the deﬁnition of d(·). Also note that in
the proﬁt function the price of the ﬁrm is updated using the time-dependent rule (13)
and such pricingpolicy holdsuntil theﬁrm receives a new random signalof pricing-plan
revisions.
Optimal pricing plan
A) Optimal Probability of Pricing-Plan Revisions
A ﬁrm receiving the random signal of pricing-plan revisions at t′ chooses the high prob-
ability of pricing-plan revisions if the value of the ﬁrm—in terms of nontradables—at t′
under (1−αH) exceeds the value of the ﬁrm at t′ under (1−αL) by at least the random
cost associated ξ, this is, if and only if
D0,H,t′ − D0,L,t′ ≥ ξ . (16)
Recall that the random cost ξ is in units of nontradable output. Moreover, assume
that ξ has a cumulative density function G(·). Thus, before observing the realization
of ξ, the probability of z choosing (1 − αH) is given by Pr[D0,H,t′ − D0,L,t′ ≥ ξ] =
G(D0,H,t′ − D0,L,t′).
As argued by Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), the continuity of G(·) and the fact
that there is a large number of ﬁrms imply that the fraction of ﬁrms choosing (1 − αH),
conditional on receiving the random signal of pricing-plan revisions at t′, is
λt′ = G(D0,H,t′ − D0,L,t′).
Letting g(·) denote the density function of ξ, the conditional expected random cost is
Ξt′ ≡ 1/G(D0,H,t′ − D0,L,t′) ·
  [D0,H,t′−D0,L,t′]
0 xg(x)dx.




ιexp(−ιξ) ifξ ≥ 0
0 ifξ < 0
, with ι > 0.
4 Thus, the density function of the random lump-sum cost, implies:5
















Firm z maximizes the expected present value of the ﬁrm described by (14), (15), (17)
and (18) subject to the demand function (8) and the technology
y
N
t (z) = nt(z), (19)
where yN
t (z) is the total output produced by the ﬁrm, and nt(z) is the amount of labor
employed. yN
t (z) has two components: output produced to satisfy consumer demand
yN
c,t(z) and output required in pricing activities by ﬁrms incurring the random lump-sum
cost, yN
p,t(z), that is, yN
t (z) ≡ yN
c,t(z) + yN
p,t(z).
Constant returns to scale imply that the total cost of production required to meet
consumer demand can be written as ψtyN
c,t(z), where ψt is the real marginal cost, in
4DifferentfromDotsey King and Wolman (1999)or Burstein (2002),I donot need to impose an upper
bound for the random variable ξ. This is because ﬁrms have the option of not paying the random cost and
still change prices, but with a lower frequency.
5Note that the expected random lump-sum cost is conditional on ξ satisfying [D0,H,t′ − D0,L,t′] ≥
ξ ≥ 0. Otherwise, according to (16), the ﬁrm chooses not to pay the random cost. To obtain equation
(18) compute 1/G(D0,H,t′ − D0,L,t′) ·
  [D0,H,t′−D0,L,t′]
0 xg(x)dx. Thus the term 1/λt in (18) is part
of the conditional distribution.
14terms of nontradables, implied by the optimal input demand.6 This, together with the
market clearing condition cN
t (z) = yN
c,t(z) and the demand function (8) yields the real























where, as mentioned above, pN
j,t(z) evolves according to the time-dependent rule (13).
Consider a ﬁrm z which receives the random signal to change pricing policies in t′.





























for s = 1,2,3,....










































































































is the s-period ahead discount factor between t′ and
t′ + s.8 Note that I use the notation
 0
=1(·) ≡ 1. Moreover, I dropped the ﬁrm’s index
because ﬁrms choosing (1 − αj) at t′ are symmetric.
Equations (24) and (25) resemble the conditions obtained in time-dependent pricing
models by Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2003) and by Cespedes, Kumhof and Parrado
(2003). Here however, ﬁrms choose also their probability of pricing-plan revisions,
(1 − αj), which in turn generates endogenous ﬂuctuations in the aggregate level of
nominal rigidities.
7To obtain the expression (24) substitute recursively (22) for s = 1,2,3... into (21). Similarly, to
obtain the expression (25) substitute recursively (23) for s = 2,3,4... into the right-hand side of (23)
for s = 1.






with Ωt′,t′ ≡ 1.
16Evolution of average frequency of pricing-plan revisions
Let Vt be the mass of ﬁrms that the last time that they revised pricing policies, before
and up to t, they chose (1−αH). I refer to this as ﬁrms acting under (1−αH) at t—see
Figure 1. Note that this implies that the mass of ﬁrms choosing (1 − αH) at time t is
Vt − Vt−1.
Similarly, let  t be the mass of ﬁrms acting subject to (1−αL) at t. Given the initial
conditions  −1 and V−1, the evolution of Vt and  t can be described with the recursions:
Vt = Vt−1 + λt(1 − αL) t−1 − (1 − λt)(1 − αH)Vt−1 (26)
 t = 1 − Vt , (27)
 −1 =  , and V−1 = V .
Therecursion(26)impliesthatthenetmassofﬁrmschoosing(1−αH)att, Vt−Vt−1,
equalsthemassofﬁrmsthatdecided toswitchfrom(1−αL) to(1−αH) at thebeginning
of the period, minus the mass of ﬁrms switching back from (1−αH) to (1−αL). Thus,
the second term in equation (26) states that, at time t, a fraction λt of the mass receiving
the random signal of pricing-plan revisions (at the beginning of t) with low probability,
(1 − αL) t−1, will choose (1 − αH)—i.e., pay the random cost. The third term states
that a fraction (1 − λt) of ﬁrms under (1 − αH) decides not to pay the random cost and
switches back to (1 − αL), i.e., (1 − λt)(1 − αH)Vt−1 choose (1 − αL).
Equation (27) holds because the mass of ﬁrms is constant and equal to one, so that
Vt +  t = 1 for all t = 0, 1, 2.... The initial conditions are determined by the steady
state of the economy.
Assuming that each period represents one quarter, it follows that, in average, ﬁrms
17in the economy change pricing policies
Ft ≡ (1 − αL) t + (1 − αH)(1 −  t) (28)
times per quarter. Note that, although the expected frequency of pricing-plan revisions
can take only two values at ﬁrm level, the average frequency of pricing-plan revisions at
the aggregate level, Ft, is a double-bounded continuous function, with upper and lower
bounds (1 − αH) and (1 − αL), respectively.
The price level
To aggregate prices, it is convenient to rewrite the price index for nontradables P N
t ≡
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ˆ z ∈ [0,1] is chosen so that the integral in the subindex P N
j,t aggregates prices of ﬁrms
acting subject to (1 − αj) in time t.
As in the standard Calvo (1983)-Yun (1996) framework, given the assumption of
a constant probability of changing pricing policies, the price sub-index P N
j,t can be ex-
pressed as a weighted average of prices optimally chosen in the past—weighted by αj.
However, different from time-dependent pricing models, the mass of ﬁrms setting a new
pricing policy under (1 − αj) changes with the state of the economy. Accordingly, we













(1 − αL) t−s−1




















(1 − αH)(1 −  t−s−1)














t−s is expressed as the mass of ﬁrms that had the opportunity to revise pricing policies
at the beginning of the period t − s, (1 − αL) t−s−1, minus the net mass of those that
decided to choose (1−αH), (Vt−s −Vt−s−1). Similarly, in the sub-index P N
H,t, the mass





under (1 − αH) is expressed as the mass of
ﬁrms under the high probability that received the random signal of pricing-plan changes
at the beginning of the period t − s, (1 − αH)(1 −  t−s−1), plus the net mass of ﬁrms
choosing (1 − αH) at t − s, this is, (Vt−s − Vt−s−1).
The price index described by (29a), (29b) and (29c) contains as especial case the
price index based in time-dependent pricing policies discussed in Calvo, Celasun and
Kumhof (2003) or Cespedes, Kumhof and Parrado (2003).
To see that, consider a situation in which the cost to revise pricing policies more
frequently is sufﬁciently high such that ﬁrms keep the low probability of pricing-policy
revisions under any state of the economy. Then from the condition (16) it follows that
λt = 0 ∀t and from the equations (26)-(27) follows that  t =   = 1 ∀t and Vt = V = 0
















This is the price index presented in Calvo et al. (2003) for an open economy and in
Cespedes et al. (2003) for a closed economy.
In the general case however, the cost of additional pricing-plan revisions is not re-
strictive, thus the evolution of the mass of ﬁrms choosing to revise pricing policies more
frequently shapes the dynamics of the price index.
2.3 Government
The ﬁscal authority holds a stock of internationally traded bonds, bg,t, denominated in
units of tradable goods. The monetary authority issues money at the gross rate ̺t ≡
Mt/Mt−1 and makes lump-sum transfers at. The consolidated budget constraint of the
government, in terms of tradables, is
bg,t−1(1 + r) +
Mt − Mt−1
Et
= bg,t + at, (30)
for which, the no Ponzi game condition limt→∞
bg,t−mt
(1+r)t = 0 holds. Note that the money





To closethemodelI specify thepath forthedepreciation rate {εt}∞
t=0 oralternatively
the path for the money growth rate {̺t}∞
t=0 in the context of policy experiments in the
next section. Appendix A states a formal deﬁnition of equilibrium for the economy and
9In numerical simulations, a high enough mean of the random cost (e.g. E[ξ] = 1/ι = 1e3) produces
λt ∼ = 0∀t,  t ∼ = 1 and Vt ∼ = 0 ∀t as shown in the next section.
20its characterization as a system of equations.
3 Stabilization Programs: Dynamics
3.1 Solution Algorithm and Calibration
I solve the model using an iterative backward recursion algorithm. That method is used
forexamplebyGolosovandLucas(2003)orBurstein(2002)forstate-dependentpricing
models for closed economies and by Mendoza and Uribe (1997) for an open economy
with ﬂexible prices.
Following Golosov and Lucas (2003),10 the algorithm assumes that there is a period
t = T when the economy reaches a new steady state. i) I make an initial guess for the
path of the aggregate variables {CN
t ,πt,ψt}∞
t=0, given that guess ii) I solve the for the
ﬁrm level prices {ν∗
j,t,̟j,t}∞
t=0 from the system (24)-(25) with j = H,L and iii) I use
that sequence to aggregate prices together with the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions
and budget constraints to construct the implied path of {CN
t ,πt,ψt}∞
t=0. If each element
of the guess in i) and the path found in iii) have a difference smaller than 1e−6 I stop,
otherwise I iterate over i), ii) and iii) to ﬁnd convergence.
Calibration
Icalibrate theeconomy using parametervalues often used in the literatureofdisinﬂation
programs for small open economies. The discount factor (β = 0.984) implies a real rate
of return of 6.5 percent annually. The parameter Γ = 1 corresponds to a logarithmic
utility function in (the quasidifference of) consumption. γ = 0.5 is the elasticity of the
10Golosov and Lucas (2003) study credible and noncredible permanent disinﬂation programs under
perfect foresight—among other experiments—for a state-dependent pricing model in a closed economy.
21Parameter Value Description
Preferences
β = .984 subjective discount factor
γ = .5 elasticity of consumption aggregator w.r.t. tradables
ϕ = .5 habit parameter
θ = 6 own price-elasticity of nontradables
ζ = 3 inverse wage-elasticity of labor supply
κ = 0.124 preference parameter
Γ = 1 preference parameter
Pricing mechanism
(1 − αL) = .2 lower bound for average frequency of pricing-plan revisions (Ft)
(1 − αH) = .5 upper bound for average frequency of pricing-plan revisions (Ft)
ι = 1/0.005 inverse of expected random cost in units of nontradable output
Transaction Costs and Endowments
K = 3.8 scale parameter in transaction costs technology
ς = 1/0.2 inverse elasticity of money demand w.r.t. it/(1 + it)
Y T = 1/3 endowment of tradables
b−1 = bg,−1 = 0 initial stocks of bonds (households and governmentrespectively)
Monetary Policy
εh(= ̺h) = 1.27 Quarterly gross devaluation (money growth) rate before the program
εl(= ̺l) = 1.024 Quarterly gross devaluation (money growth) rate during the program
τ = 12 Time duration of the program in quarters (temporary program)
Table 1: Baseline Calibration
consumption aggregator with respect to tradables. The own-price elasticity of demand
for nontradables (θ = 6) implies a steady-state markup of 20 percent above marginal
cost.
The value of κ in the utility function is chosen such that in the pre-announcement
steady-state households allocate one third of the endowed time to labor (κ = 0.124
implies n = 1/3). The wage elasticity of labor supply is 1/ζ, which I set to 1/3. As
in Uribe (2002) preferences show non-separability over time with ϕ = 0.5. However I
also analyze the case of ϕ = 0 in the subsection 3.4.
The elasticity of money demand with respect to it/(1+it) is 1/ς in equation (11). A
valueofς = 1/0.2isconsistentwithempiricalestimatesprovidedby Reinhartand Végh
(1995). Moreover, substituting the money demand (11) into the money velocity (5)










is such that in the pre-stabilization steady-state, the money velocity is 0.32 (K = 3.8).
The endowment of tradables is Y T = 1/3 and the initial stocks of bonds are set to zero
(b−1 = bg,−1 = 0).
To make the results comparable with the existing literature of disinﬂation programs
in small open economies, the parameters of the pricing mechanism are chosen to stay
close to the standard time-dependent model. At the ﬁrm level (1 − αL) = 0.2 im-
plies that ﬁrms subject to the low probability of pricing-plan revisions set new pricing-
policies once every ﬁve quarters on average; (1−αH) = 0.5 implies that, under the high
probability of pricing-plan adjustments, ﬁrms revise pricing-policies twice per year on
average. At the aggregate level, these values imply an upper and lower bound on ﬂuctu-
ations of the average frequency of pricing-plan revisions of 2 and 0.8 revisions per year,
respectively.
Consistent with Dotsey, King and Wolman’s (1999) calibration, the parameter ι in
the distribution of the random cost G(·) implies that the unconditional expected cost is
0.005 units of nontradable output (E(ξ) = 1/ι = 0.005).
In each experiment I also simulate the economy for the case in which the degree of
nominal rigidities is constant. To do that, I set the unconditional mean of of the random
lump-sum cost to one thousand units of nontradable output (E(ξ) = 1/ι = 1e3). As
discussed above (p. 19) when the random lump-sum cost is restrictive, the price index
of the economy resemble the time-dependent price index proposed in Calvo, Celasun
and Kumhof (2001) for an open economy.
Finally, note that the high probability of pricing-plan revisions, the relevant proba-
bility for the special case of constant nominal rigidities, is in line with values used in the
literature. For example, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe’s (2001) calibration for the Mexican
23economy implies that ﬁrms on average change prices every nine months; Calvo et al.
(2003) calibrate their model such that ﬁrms change pricing plans every twelve months
on average. The benchmark calibration in the special case of constant nominal rigidities
implies that ﬁrms change pricing policies every ﬁfteen months on average. Neverthe-
less, in the subsection 3.5, I perform sensitivity analysis in this regard by assuming
that ﬁrms subject to the low probability change pricing-policies every 8.4 months on
average.
3.2 Permanent and Credible Stabilization
A permanent and credible exchange rate-based (ERB) disinﬂation program is deﬁned as







h for t < 0
ε
l for t ≥ 0,
(32)
where εh > εl.
Similarly, in a permanent and credible money-based (MB) disinﬂation program the






h for t < 0
̺
l for t ≥ 0,
(33)
where ̺h > ̺l.
Consistent with Mexico’s 1987 ERB disinﬂation experience, I calibrate the ERB
program (32) and the MB program (33) with an initial inﬂation rate of 160 percent per
year (εh = ̺h = 1.27) and a low inﬂation rate of 10 percent per year (εl = ̺l = 1.024).
Figure 2 displays the dynamics of permanent and credible ERB and MB programs.
24FortheERBprogram(Figure2(a)), themodelpredictsasustainedboominconsumption
of tradables and nontradables, whereas for the MB program (Figure 2(b)), the model
predicts an initial short-lived recession in the nontradable sector.
The lower right plots in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show that when ﬁrms confront a once-
and-for-all disinﬂation, in a perfect foresight equilibrium, they ﬁnd optimal to adjust
their pricing policies mostly through their time-dependent pricing rule (13), instead of
updating pricing policies more often. That is, the frequency of pricing-plan revisions
displays a small response to the monetary shock.
At the ﬁrm level, in the permanent ERB program, price-setters are willing to spend
about 2.2 percent of their proﬁts in increasing the frequency of pricing-plan revisions
from one revision every ﬁve quarters to one revision per year. Such incentive however,
only lasts for two quarters. A similar situation occurs in a permanent MB program.
Hence, as shown in Figure 2, in permanent and credible ERB and MB programs the
dynamics of the model with state-dependent nominal rigidities (solid line) is very close
its special case of purely time-dependent pricing (dashed line). As shown below, this
result is speciﬁc to permanent and credible disinﬂations.
Permanent and credible stabilization programs are illustrative, but they are highly
unrealistic. As pointed out by Calvo and Végh (1999), a common characteristic of
stabilization programs is imperfect credibility. I explore the effects of lack of credibility
in the next two experiments.
3.3 Temporary Stabilization
Calvo (1986) proposes to address lack of credibility in stabilization programs by for-
mally modeling the stabilization episode as temporary. Following Calvo (1986), in a
temporary exchange rate-based disinﬂation the monetary authority reduces the depreci-
25ation rate from εh to εl for τ quarters. That is,
εt =

     
     
ε
h for t < 0
ε
l for t ∈ [0,τ)
ε
h for t ≥ τ .
(34)
In a temporary money-based disinﬂation program the monetary authority reduces
the money growth rate from ̺h to ̺l for τ quarters. That is,
̺t =

     
     
̺
h for t < 0
̺
l for t ∈ [0,τ)
̺
h for t ≥ τ .
(35)
The temporary programs (34) and (35) are calibrated with εh = ϕh = 1.27, εl =
ϕh = 1.024 and τ = 12. These values imply a pre-announcement steady-state inﬂation
rate of 160 percent per year and a temporary target for the inﬂation rate of 10 percent
per year. The program is in place for twelve quarters and the low-inﬂation target is
abandoned thereafter.
Figure 3(a) captures the main result of the paper. In ERB temporary disinﬂations,
the model with state-dependent nominal rigidities (solid line) predicts a sustained boom
in nontradables—i.e., the sector with nominal rigidities,—followedby a later recession.
The peak of the boom is reached in the eighth quarter after the implementation of the
program. In contrast, in the special case of constant nominal rigidities (dashed line) the
recession in nontradables sets forth just after the announcement of the program 11.
The intuition for this result is clear. The lower right panel of Figure 3(a) shows that
11In time-dependent models, the prediction that the recession phase starts immediately after the be-
ginning of the program is also found in Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2003) or in Uribe (1999). That is
however, at odds with empirical evidence.
26the average frequency of pricing-plan revisions grows from one revision per year on
impact, to two revision per year by the end of the program. That is, as the program
goes on, the economy faces a gradually lower degree of nominal rigidities. That in turn,
allows for a sustained expansion in nontradables.
At the microeconomic level, Figure 3(a) shows that when the ERB program is per-
ceived as temporary, ﬁrms have a strong incentive to adjust their pricing policies more
often in order to accommodate the new state of the economy. Firms are willing to spend
between ﬁve and six percent of their proﬁts in additional pricing-plan revisions. Such
incentive lasts for almost the entire duration of the program. This quantitative result is
in line with ﬁrm-level evidence on the cost of pricing activities presented in Zbaraki et
al. (2003) 12.
Figure 3(a) also shows that the initial equilibrium path of other key macroeconomic
variables is in accordance with observed ERB disinﬂation episodes. Namely, a gradual
fall in inﬂation, an initial appreciation of the real exchange rate and a boom-recession
cycle in the tradable sector 13.
Figure 3(b) shows the dynamics of the temporary MB program. Both models predict
an initial short-lived recession in the nontradable sector followed by a recovery. The
initial adverse effect in nontradables is of about the same magnitude with constant or
with state-dependent nominal rigidities. On the other hand, the equilibrium paths differ.
State-dependentnominalrigiditiesallowforafasterrecoverythat bringsthenontradable
12Zbaraki et al. (2003) document price adjustment practices for a U.S. industrial manufacturer. They
ﬁnd that the ﬁrm’s cost of pricing activities represents 4.05 percent of the gross proﬁt margin, that is 1.22
percent of their revenues.
13The model fails to predict however, a sustained real exchange rate appreciation. That feature com-
bined with a boom-recession cycle in tradables and nontradables is known in the literature as the price-
consumption puzzle. Uribe (2002) proposes the introduction of habit formation as a solution for the
price-consumption puzzle. Moreover, Mendoza and Uribe (1997) rationalize those facts in programs of
uncertain duration. In numerical simulations, the aforementioned papers assume ﬂexible prices and im-
pose asymmetries in the production of tradables and nontradables. In particular, they assume investment
in the tradable sector. I do not attempt to pursue such task here.
27sector to higher levels than its pre-disinﬂation level. Note however that, as shown in
the next section, when the program is of uncertain duration, the recovery phase in the
nontradable sector is weaker.
3.4 Program with Uncertain Duration
FollowingMendoza and Uribe (1999), in a ERB (MB) program with uncertain duration,
the monetary authority announces at time t = 0 a reduction in the depreciation rate
(money growth rate) from εh(= ̺h) = 1.27 to εl(= ̺l) = 1.024. Agents assign a
time-dependent probability to the abandonment of the program in the next period. That
is, the public expects in date t the program to be abandoned at t + 1 with probability
ht ≡ Pr(εt+1 = εh|εt = εl)—similarly for MB programs I deﬁne ht ≡ Pr(̺t+1 =
̺h|̺t = ̺l). I also assume that the program ends with probability one in the period
t = τ, that is hτ−1 = 1. Moreover, εh is an absorbent state in the sense that once εh is
realized, the monetary authority keeps the high depreciation rate with probability one.
Based on empirical evidence on devaluation probabilities provided by Blanco and
Garber (1986), the hazard function assumed is J-shaped. As shown in the upper right
panel of Figures 4(a) and 4(b), the hazard function implies that when the disinﬂation is
announced, thepublicexpect that theprogram will collapseint = 1 with probability0.4
(h0 = 0.4), the probability of collapse decreases to zero in the fourth quarter (h4 = 0)
and then rises gradually to one in the eleventh quarter (h11 = 1), that is, the program
lasts at most 12 quarters.
Figure 4 shows the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables for the ERB and MB
programs with uncertain duration. The solid line (—) shows the equilibrium path for the
model with state-dependent nominal rigidities under the scenario that the program lasts
for exactly 12 quarters. The mark (+) shows the alternative value at t of the correspond-
28ing variable if the program is abandoned at t (the remaining path under such state is not
shown). Finally, the dashed line (−−) shows the equilibrium path for the special case of
constant nominal rigidities when the program lasts for 12 quarters. To isolate the effects
of habit formation, this experiment assumes time separability in consumption (ϕ = 0),
and all other parameters values as those in Table 1.
Figure 4(a) shows that the qualitative properties of the model discussed in the last
subsection for a temporary ERB program also hold when agents perceive the program
as of uncertain duration. In particular, in the model with endogenous nominal rigidities
(solid line) the peak of the boom in nontradables occurs six quarters after the program
is announced. In its peak level, consumption of nontradables is eight percent above its
pre-disinﬂation level. The later recession drops the level of nontradables to ten percent
below its pre-disinﬂation level by the end of the program.
In contrast, constant nominal rigidities (dashed line) induces a jump on impact in
the nontradable sector of about two percent, followed by a deep contraction that sets the
level of nontradables 20 percent below its pre-disinﬂation level. The equilibrium path of
inﬂation, the real exchange rate and consumption of tradables resemble the one induce
by the temporary ERB program discused in the last subsection.
On the other hand, Figure 4(b) displays the equilibrium path induced by a MB pro-
gram of uncertain duration. When we account for uncertainty, both models predict an
initialcontraction in nontradables of about 12 percent, followed by a recovery. Different
from the previous experiment, in the case of state-dependent nominal rigidities, the con-
sumption of nontradables remains below its pre-disinﬂation level during its equilibrium
path.
293.5 Sensitivity Analysis
I perform sensitivityanalysis in four key parameter values. First, there is little empirical
evidence on the degree of nominal rigidities in small open economies, thus although
the baseline parameter values are in the range of those commonly used in the literature,
I also calibrate a lower degree of nominal rigidities by setting (1 − αH) = 0.7 and
(1 − αL) = 0.3.
Second, the time duration of temporary disinﬂation programs varies widely. For
example, Mexico’s 1987 ERB program lasted about 28 quarters, whereas Brazil’s 1986
ERB program lasted about 4 quarters. The benchmark calibration is for 12 quarters,
thus I also simulate a program that lasts 24 quarters.
Third, for developing countries the range of estimates for the elasticity of money
demand with respect to its opportunity cost (i/(1 + i)) is large. From -0.5 for Mexico
to -0.1 for Argentina (e.g. Arrau et al. [1995]). The benchmark calibration assumes a
money demand elasticity of -0.2, the alternative value chosen is -0.5. Finally, the related
literature often assume logarithmic utility in leisure. I also do so as a robustness check.
Using the alternative parameterization discused above, Figures 5 and 6 show the
equilibrium path of inﬂation, real exchange rate, consumption of tradables and con-
sumption of nontradables for temporary ERB and MB disinﬂation programs, respec-
tively.
The simulations with the alternative calibrations conﬁrm that for temporary ERB
disinﬂations, the qualitative discrepancies in the dynamics of nontradables (the sector
with nominal rigidities) across economies with and without endogenous degree of nom-
inal rigidities hold. Moreover, for temporary MB programs both models predict and
initial short-lived contraction in nontradables of about the same order of magnitude.
304 Concluding Remarks
Nominal rigidities have proven central in the understanding of business cycle ﬂuctu-
ations. However, most of the existing literature characterizes the degree of nominal
rigidities as an exogenous feature embedded in pricing practices at the microeconomic
level. That not only isolates the effects of macroeconomic policies on the speed of
adjustment of ﬁrms’ pricing policies, but in turn isolates the effects of endogenous ﬂuc-
tuations of the aggregate degree of nominal rigidities on macroeconomic variables.
This paper builds on the ﬁrm-level pricing theory proposed by Calvo (1983) by
adding elements of state-dependent pricing. Whereby price-setters can set optimal pric-
ing policies more often when confronted with macroeconomic shocks. That new feature
shows to be important in explaining business cycle ﬂuctuations in consumption associ-
ated to exchange rate-based disinﬂation programs of the type of those implemented in
several Latin American economies. At the same time, the model shows to be capable of
generating dynamics qualitatively consistent with money-based disinﬂation episodes.
The model can be extended in several aspects to improve its quantitative properties.
An extension of interest is the incorporation of more realistic production structures.
Finally, I must point out that the paper relies on transmission mechanisms widely dis-
cussed in the literature of disinﬂation programs. Namely, supply-side effects, nominal
rigidities and intertemporal effects of temporary disinﬂations.
31A Appendix A: Equilibrium
In ERB programs, given a sequence of real money balances, a government policy is
deﬁned by a sequence of transfers and exchange rate depreciation {at,εt}∞
t=0. In MB
programs, given a sequence of exchange rate depreciation, a government policy is de-
ﬁned by a sequence of transfers and money growth rate {at,̺t}∞
t=0. An allocation is
a sequence of aggregate consumption, consumption of tradables, consumption of non-
tradables, labor, real money balances, money velocity and production of nontradables
{Ct, CT
t , CN
t , nt, mt, ut, cN
t (z), yN
t (z), nt(z) ∀z}∞
t=0. A price system is a sequence of




An equilibriumgivenb−1 and bg,−1 is an allocation, a price system and a government
policy such that: i) given a price system and a government policy, the representative
household chooses {Ct, CT
t , CN
t , nt, mt, ut, cN
t (z), ∀z}∞
t=0 to maximizethe utilityindex
described by (2) and (7) subject to (3), (4), (5) and (6). ii) Given a government policy,
ﬁrms z ∈ [0,1] choose pN
t (z) to maximize the value of the ﬁrm described by equations
(14), (15), (17) and (18) subject to (8) and (19), where the relation between pN
t (z) and
P N
t is given by (13), (29a), (29b) and (29c). iii) The nontradable goods market clears
cN
t (z) = yN
c,t(z)∀z, the labor market clears nt =
  1
0 nt(z)dz at a wage rate Wt.
Characterization of a perfect foresight equilibrium


































where K∗ ≡ K1/ς ς/(ς − 1).
Substituting the government budget constraint (30) into the household budget con-





































































As in Yun (1996), deﬁne the alternative price index Pt ≡











c,t(z)dz. Moreover deﬁne the ratio of
price indexes Rt ≡ P t
 
Pt, then from the market clearing condition for nontradables












































Finally, from the production technology we obtain the marginal cost:
ψt = wt. (43)
For an ERB program, given a sequence for the deprecation rate εt, equations (1),
(3), (4), (10), (11), (12), (17), (18), (20), (26), (27), (28), (31), (36)-(43) and (14), (15),
(24) and (25) for j = H,L is a system of 29 equations in 28 variables and one scalar
(the Lagrange multiplier): Ct, CN
t , CT
t , nt, it, st, mt, ut, πt, et, wt,̺t, Rt, λt, dt, Ξt,
Vt,  t, Ft, ψt, D0,H,t, D1,H,t, D0,L,t, D1,L,t, ν∗
H,t, ν∗
L,t, ̟H,t, ̟L,t and χ. Its solution
characterize an equilibrium 15.
For a MB program, given a sequence for the money growth rate ̺t, equations (1),
(3), (4), (10), (11), (12), (17), (18), (20), (26), (27), (28), (31), (36)-(43) and (14), (15),
(24) and (25) for j = H,L is a system of 29 equations in 28 variables and one scalar
(the Lagrange multiplier): Ct, CN
t , CT
t , nt, it, st, mt, ut, πt, et, wt,εt, Rt, λt, dt, Ξt,
Vt,  t, Ft, ψt, D0,H,t, D1,H,t, D0,L,t, D1,L,t, ν∗
H,t, ν∗
L,t, ̟H,t, ̟L,t and χ. Its solution
characterize an equilibrium.
15Note that the initial and ﬁnal conditionsare givenby the pre-disinﬂationand post-disinﬂationsteady-
states, respectively.
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Figure 2: Permanent and Credible Disinﬂation Programs
The permanent ERB (MB) disinﬂation program consists in a reduction of the depreciation rate (money
growth rate) from 160 to 10 percent per year in t = 0. The solid line (—) shows the model with state-
dependent nominal rigidities. The dashed line (−−) shows the special case with constant nominal rigidi-
ties. The parameter values are those in Table 1.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Temporary Disinﬂation Programs
The temporary ERB (MB) disinﬂation program consists in a reduction of the depreciation rate (money
growth rate) from 160 to 10 percent per year for 12 quarters, restoring its high level thereafter. The solid
line(—)shows theequilibriumpathwithstate-dependentnominalrigidities. Thedashedline(−−)shows
the special case with constant nominal rigidities. The parameter values are those in Table 1.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Disinﬂation Programs with Uncertain Duration
The ERB (MB) disinﬂation program consists in a reduction of the depreciation rate (money growth rate)
from 160 to 10 percent per year, which agents perceive as of uncertain duration. The hazard function in
the upper right panel shows the probability of the exchange rate depreciation (money growth rate) taking
a value of 160 percent in t + 1 conditional on been 10 percent at t. The solid line (—) shows the model
with state-dependent nominal rigidities for a program lasting at most 12 quarters. The mark (+) shows
the alternative value at t of the corresponding variable if the program is abandoned at t (the remaining
path under such state is not shown). The dashed line (−−) shows the equilibrium path with constant
nominal rigidities. The calibration assumes ϕ = 0. All other parameter values are those in Table 1.




























































































































































Figure 5: Sensitivity Analysis for ERB Disinﬂations
Sensitivity analysis for temporary ERB disinﬂations. The solid line (—) shows the equilibrium path with
state-dependent nominal rigidities. The dashed line (−−) shows the special case with constant nominal
rigidities. The parameter values are those in Table 1, except for the corresponding parameter indicated
above.



























































































































































Figure 6: Sensitivity Analysis for MB Disinﬂations
Sensitivity analysis for temporary MB disinﬂations. The solid line (—) shows the equilibrium path with
state-dependent nominal rigidities. The dashed line (−−) shows the special case with constant nominal
rigidities. The parameter values are those in Table 1, except for the corresponding parameter indicated
above.
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